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In this reflection paper, Jan Orbie and Ferdi De Ville contribute their 5 cents to the 
debate on the impact of the corona crisis. They look at a specific policy domain, 
European Union (EU) trade policy, by engaging in ‘academic distancing’, namely 
through the lens of paradigm change theory. In doing so, they make an analytical 
distinction between three paradigms: neoliberalism, securitization, and 
deglobalization.†  
 
 
SYNTHESIS 
 
The resilience of the neoliberal free trade paradigm in the post-covid-19 era should 
not be underestimated, at least in the short term. The EU’s trade policy response 
has so far been compliant with free trade philosophy and this has not faced serious 
challenges yet. Ostensibly protectionist measures are explicitly framed as 
temporary and exceptional and have been accompanied by liberalizing proposals. 
In the medium and long term, paradigm change may happen. However, the authors 
warn that such shifts may not be as romantic as envisaged by deglobalization 
advocates, because also securitization looms as a realistic and dangerous 
alternative. While both deglobalization and securitization involve less trade, their 
political underpinnings are radically different. 
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Introduction 
 
Undoubtedly, the world will never be the same after the corona crisis. 
Notwithstanding the dreadful events all over the world, the current crisis also 
provides a fascinating episode for researchers. We refer not only to virologists but 
also to social scientists who have, by default, a keen interest in political, economic 
and societal shifts. Scholars studying the European Union (EU) already have some 
experience with analyzing crises. Not only are EU policies bound to change, many 
observers alert that the entire European project is at stake. The scholarly debate 
and political struggle to understand the crisis has already started.  
 
With this reflection paper, we aim to contribute our ‘five cents’ to this debate. In 
doing so, we focus on the EU’s trade policy. Trade is one of the EU’s strongest policy 
domains: the EU has an exclusive legal competence, significant market power, and 
strong historical track record. Europe’s common commercial policy projects the 
essence of the European construction, which is the political economy of market 
integration, towards its relations with the wider world. The future of trade, as one 
of the key dimensions of globalization, has also been central in the debates on the 
impact of the corona crisis. 
 
At first glance, soundbites given and measures taken by EU trade policy 
representatives seem confusing. While the European Commissioner for 
International Trade, Phil Hogan, stresses the need for open trade and even more 
intensified liberalization (especially in medical equipment), the French Minister of 
Finance Bruno Le Maire argues in favour of ‘European industrial sovereignty’ and 
‘legitimate protection’, and even the Dutch Trade Minister (not known for 
protectionist inclinations) says that ‘it is time to take a step back’ and ‘rethink our 
trade deals to take a closer look at sustainability in value chains’. While some warn 
that the corona crisis facilitates shifts towards authoritarianism and the end of 
liberal values, which reminds of the interbellum period of beggar-thy-neighbour 
protectionism, others see an opportunity to dismantle globalization in favour of 
more local and more sustainable production. There are calls for ‘reshoring’ of 
critical and strategic industries, practices of ‘nationalization’, and border controls 
have been re-established, but it is unclear how sustainable (in both senses of the 
word) government interventions will be.  
 
When aiming to come to grips with changes and continuities in EU trade policy, our 
starting point is blunt and clear: EU trade policy is outspokenly neoliberal. This is 
despite some emphasis on ‘harnessing’ or ‘managing globalization’ through trade 
and ‘sustainable’ or ‘ethical’ trade arrangements, as well as protectionist and 
mercantilist tendencies in defense of sensitive industries and toward economic 
competitors. Overall, the EU has assertively (some would say, aggressively) 
pursued free trade at the multilateral level of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and most visibly through a new generation of bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTAs) concluded with Korea, Japan, Canada, Vietnam, the Andean Community and 
many other countries in the Global South. Since the end 1980s, interests, ideas and 
institutions of EU trade policy have consistently coalesced into a neoliberal trade 
paradigm. This involves an obstinate belief that ever more export and liberalization 
will bring growth, which eventually entails peace and welfare to societies. 
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We are thus mainly interested in how this neoliberal paradigm might be affected 
by the corona crisis. We also pay attention to new and nitty-gritty EU trade policy 
measures, but mainly from the vantage point of whether and how these relate to 
changes of the EU’s free trade orientation. How might the current crisis impact on 
the neoliberal trade paradigm and under what conditions might we see alternative 
paradigms emerging? A long procession of pundits is announcing an entirely 
different world when the corona crisis is over, but can we expect the EU to throw 
its free trade recipes out of the window in order to be replaced by… what? 
 
 
Cent 1: We don’t know 
 
Let’s start with an easy but important caveat: just like virologists have apparently 
not really had a clue about the virus’ implications and are learning-by-doing, also 
social scientists should be wary about making predictions and can only hope for 
progressive insights (pun intended). Political scientists have proven to be 
particularly bad at forecasting the future – especially beforehand. We tend to 
overemphasize continuity in uneventful times and overestimate changes in times of 
crisis. Much depends also on how a ‘crisis’ is defined and interpreted, something 
about which academics typically disagree as it often closely relates to their 
personal preferences and (sub)disciplines. People’s worst fears and fiercest hopes 
become projected onto predicted change and continuities.  
 
Predictions on the future course of a policy domain such as commercial policy 
become even more difficult as this is inevitably entangled with wider domestic and 
international developments. EU trade policy changes would be contingent on how 
the economic recession will be addressed, on whether the crisis leads to more 
conflict or cooperation between countries in Europe and worldwide, on domestic 
political changes all over the world, and many other (f)actors.  
 
What makes it even more difficult is that analysts use different benchmarks to 
evaluate change. What constitutes meaningful change? Do we notice relevant 
policy shifts when instruments are modified to cope with the new situation, or do 
we refrain from talking about real change until a complete overhaul of existing 
structures has taken place?  
 
While it is too early to make predictions, it is high time for debating the post-corona 
era. Despite uncertainties, we do have some basic theoretical frameworks and 
insights from historical precedents, as will be shown in the next two sections. 
 
 
Cent 2: Paradigm change: a basic framework 
 
We do have some conceptual tools at our disposal to think about change and 
continuity. Based on Peter Hall’s work, scholars generally distinguish three ‘orders 
of change’ in politics. First-order change or ‘policy change’ only involves an 
adjustment in the settings of existing instruments. Second-order change or 
‘programme change’ refers to innovations in the policy instruments themselves. 
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Most fundamentally, third-order change entails a true paradigmatic shift. 
Importantly, ‘paradigm change’ involves a radical rejection of how we used to think 
about organizing society and a shift in its philosophical underpinnings. Therefore, 
our interest in paradigm change of EU trade policy involves not only measures that 
pursue free trade and export-led growth somehow differently, but more 
fundamentally whether its neoliberal foundations (the belief that free trade is 
desirable as it maximizes well-being and every deviation from that principle should 
be strictly exceptional and conditional) may be eroded or even replaced. 
 
Moreover, the drivers of paradigm change are also well known. From existing 
studies, three conditions for change can be identified. First, the extent to which a 
crisis is seen as seriously undermining existing beliefs. Rather than ‘objective’ 
causes, it is important to understand the perceived roots of the crisis – which are 
typically manifold and hence open for political debate. What exactly is this a crisis 
of, and therefore how should it be tackled? Second, whether alternative paradigms 
are readily available and considered to be legitimate. Does the slogan used by 
Margaret Thatcher that ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA) still hold today? Third, how 
much the crisis has shaken up existing power structures. Established forces might 
be obligated to give up on their privileges, but they may also retain their positions 
and even use the opportunity to strengthen their power. Who wins and loses from 
the crisis and possible alternatives? 
 
Figure 1: Paradigms and drivers of change 
 
 
Hence, we need to evaluate how the corona crisis would be perceived from a trade 
perspective, how it affects our thinking on EU external trade, and whether it has 
impacted on power relations inside and outside the EU. This framework (Figure 1), 
which we have also explored in relation to the EU’s trade policy response to the 
euro crisis and the current challenges in EU development policy, makes it easier to 
structure and critically assess the impacts of the corona crisis on EU trade policy. It 
 - 6 - 
helps not only to put putative changes into perspective (policy shifts are not always 
as radical as they are presented!) but also to foster alternative imaginaries of what 
trade policy could be (what is out-of-the box?). While it remains difficult to know 
what such alternatives might be, we will below elaborate on two candidates: 
securitization and deglobalization. But first, it needs to be stressed that despite 
some superficial indications of the contrary, the current free trade paradigm is not 
likely to go away anytime soon. 
 
 
Cent 3: Neoliberalism is resilient and re-inventive 
 
Paradigm change is rare. Based on precedents, it seems premature to announce it 
during times of crises. Despite manifold predictions of a new Keynesian and anti-
neoliberal era, the Asian and global financial disruption of 1997-1999 and the 
American and European banking crisis of 2008-2009, have not involved significant 
change. For some, these crises have damaged the legitimacy of the neoliberal 
paradigm, but overall, the EU has reverted to ‘business as usual’ policies. 
Moreover, crises might even reinforce neoliberal policies and beliefs, depending 
on how they are interpreted, on what beliefs are dominant, and on who is in power 
(see the three conditions above). As we will see below, this is a feasible scenario. 
 
Paradigms are no fixed objects that can be overthrown with a single well-aimed 
shot. They are dynamic and inventive in readjusting themselves through crises. 
Such creative reinvention (rather than destruction) typically involves new policy 
measures and experiments that are sometimes portrayed as radical departures 
from previous, delegitimized practices – which adds to their legitimacy. Paradigms 
are continuously being stretched and transformed, without touching the underlying 
‘third-order’ beliefs. One strategy in this regard is to coopt concepts from critical 
corners, such as ‘sustainability’, ‘participation’, ‘partnership’, ‘fairness’, ‘global 
justice’, ‘resilience’, ‘inclusion’, ‘participation’ and ‘multi-stakeholderism’, and 
soon perhaps ‘strategic security’ or ‘deglobalisation’. Once radical concepts are 
stripped of their political meaning and subtly molded with neoliberal logics, they 
can be used in a technocratic way. 
 
The ‘strange non-death of neoliberalism’ has been observed before. In relation to 
the euro crisis, protectionism was seen as the problem and more free trade as a 
solution, which made the EU even reinforce its free trade orientation. While critical 
observers and activists saw the crisis as clear evidence of the failure of the growth-
led economic paradigm, the impressive range of measures taken seemed only of 
first- and second-order extent. In terms of trade, the European Commission even 
reinforced its efforts in negotiating trade liberalization agreements with strong 
economies such as Canada, Japan and the US. 
 
Applied to today’s EU trade policy, the concrete measures and proposals that we 
have heard so far clearly signal continuity more than anything else. Despite calls 
that we may witness a new Keynesian moment or even an overthrowing of 
capitalism, nothing close to paradigm change seems to be happening so far. Two 
points are important to emphasize in this regard. First, there has been much talk 
about ‘reshoring’ the production of ‘strategic’ industries to Europe. This is not 
 - 7 - 
surprising given the inadequate supply of medical and pharmaceutical products. 
However, there are so far no indications that this would go beyond a limited 
number of ‘critical products’ such as protective workwear, ventilators and other 
medical equipment. It would be premature to see this as the hallmark of a new 
industrial policy (in fact, the EU had already adopted a ‘new’ industrial policy 
following the euro crisis which turned out to be old wine in new bottles). Former 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson was quick to warn that the list of ‘critical 
industries’ should not be interpreted too widely and to mention an anecdote 
whereby the French once designated yoghurt as a strategic industry (anecdotes 
and stereotypes about the French are always helpful to warn against supposedly 
protectionist tendencies). An influential MEP and former trade minister equally 
emphasized that the idea of strategic reshoring ‘makes sense only if it is limited to 
certain very specific sectors such as steel’. Similarly, the chairman of the 
International Trade Committee of the European Parliament, Bernd Lange, qualified 
that ‘just-in time production will be reduced a little bit’. While far-reaching and 
permanent reshoring might entail deglobalization, the EU’s response so far has 
been much more modest: compromising a bit on efficiency to guarantee supply of 
a confined number of products. In addition, EU trade policy-makers have 
highlighted that the strengthening of the WTO, including the creation of an interim 
appeals mechanism, the so-called ‘Multi-Party Interim Arbitration Arrangement’, is 
all the more important ‘to help us recover from this crisis’. 
 
The same applies to European export restrictions. While initially there were many 
concerns about export restrictions of some EU member states like Germany, the 
European Commission quickly took the initiative to Europeanize an export 
authorization regime in mid-March, which would be further narrowed down to a 
limited number of products by end-April. EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan 
stressed that these are emergency measures that should be ‘targeted, 
proportionate, transparent and temporary’ – adding that no export restrictions 
should be applied in the agri-food sector; and on 16 April he reiterated that ‘a full 
reshoring of European industries would be impossible’. Also the chairman of the 
European Parliament trade committee and the Croatian President of the Council of 
EU Trade Ministers nuanced the need for reshoring. The latter stated that ‘our 
immediate challenge is to keep trade flows open’.  
 
Second, some measures intensify the free trade logic rather than deviating from it. 
We may indeed see EU trade policy going beyond the status quo by pursuing ever 
more liberalization. Early April 2020, the European Commission decided to 
temporarily waive import tariffs of medical devices, and protective equipment, 
from third countries. Similar initiatives to facilitate trade in products that are 
essential to fight covid-19 are taken at the levels of the WTO and the World Customs 
Organization. At the virtual G20 summit on 30 March 2020, Trade Commissioner 
Phil Hogan strongly argued to ‘remove all restrictive measures on imports, notably 
on the tariff side, that were introduced before the pandemic, and set a moratorium 
on new unilateral tariffs’, and to ‘eliminate all tariffs on COVID-19 related products’. 
In the same context, he urged the WTO members to urgently work on the 
development of international rules on digital trade. Also Bernd Lange and the 
European Parliament ask for the swift conclusion of an e-commerce agreement at 
the level of the WTO. Phil Hogan summarized his speech by arguing for ‘greater 
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competition and the removal of unjustified barriers.’ On 16 April, the Commissioner 
reiterated this call and argued for a ‘plurilateral agreement that would lead to a 
level playing field, including the possible permanent liberalization of tariffs on 
medical equipment’.  
 
Remarkably, in response to the covid-19 crisis the European Commission also 
announced its intention to speed up talks with a far-reaching free trade agreement 
with the United States. A Commission spokesperson clarified that ‘efforts to 
improve transatlantic regulatory cooperation include areas very relevant for the 
fight against the coronavirus outbreak, such as medical devices and 
pharmaceuticals, including vaccines’. If that works out, the crisis would facilitate 
the finalization of an agreement that was in its previous form (the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP) highly contested for its undemocratic and 
liberalizing nature. The European Parliament’s international trade chair, in 
contrast, stated that ‘the United States are out of the game at the moment’. 
 
Meanwhile, several European brands and retailers have failed to honour their 
contracts with suppliers in the Global South, for instance the garment industry in 
Bangladesh. While the initial focus on European health and economic concerns is 
understandable, it remains to be seen how the EU or the member states might deal 
with companies that cancel orders and fail to pay for products that have already 
been made. The EU could take initiatives in this respect. For instance, EU member 
states could transpose the Unfair Trading Practices directive more swiftly and 
extend it beyond agri-food protects to include textiles and garments. Budgetary 
support to European enterprises in the context of the crisis could also be made 
conditional on honouring fair trade commitments. It seems that EU trade policy 
makers have not yet communicated on this dimension of the crisis. Following the 
EU’s neoliberal and ‘hands off’ approach to fair trade, such ethical concerns remain 
the responsibility of companies, while the EU typically provides development aid 
rather than changing trade structures. Early April, the EU announced the creation 
of a €5 million emergence cash fund for garment workers in Myanmar. The 
European Parliament does mention the interests of Southern countries, namely by 
emphasizing that these would benefit from more open international trade. 
 
In terms of cooptation of (formerly) critical concepts, EU trade policy-makers at an 
informal Meeting of EU Trade Ministers on 16 April emphasize that supply chains 
should become ‘resilient’ and ‘sustainable’. Afterward, the Dutch Trade Minister 
Sigrid Kaag explicitly stated that EU trade deals should become more ‘sustainable’ 
and ‘inclusive’. Previous research shows that the emergency of ‘resilience’ and 
‘sustainability’ concepts in EU trade discourse can be quite compatible with 
neoliberalism. 
 
To be sure, there are signs of stronger government intervention through trade. 
Mid-April the European Commission proposed a new export authorization measure 
for certain items of personal protective equipment. However, these are temporary, 
confined to specific products, and successfully aimed to prevent export restrictions 
within the EU and guarantee the internal market. The Commission also published 
guidelines on screening of incoming foreign direct investment, aimed to avoid 
‘predatory’ take-overs of weakened and strategic European firms such as 
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pharmaceutical enterprises developing a vaccine. However, this merely concerns 
legislation that was approved already in 2019. And while many analysts have 
quoted the French Minister Le Maire’s statement about ‘economic sovereignty’, 
‘reorganization of value chains’ and ‘legitimate protectionism’, they often fail to 
notice the explicit statement that the protection of strategic industries will not 
concern a major shift towards economic intervention and that any nationalization 
would be temporary. As noticed by Le Maire himself, the position is quite consistent 
with French approaches to political economy at the EU level over the past years. 
More generally, it should be noticed that French calls for protectionism seem to be 
a typical ingredient of economic crises – see also the global financial crisis of 1997-
1999 and the eurocrisis of 2008-2011 – and should therefore be taken with a grain 
of salt. It is also clear that the French government does not argue for alternative 
production models involving less economic growth. Overall, it would be 
premature, to say the least, to see Le Maire as the vanguard of the deglobalisation 
paradigm. Similar disclaimers apply to the Dutch Trade Minister’s plea for 
rethinking EU trade deals to make them more sustainable and inclusive: these 
concepts have in recent years been successfully combined with a neoliberal trade 
course (see above) and the Minister clearly adds that the Netherlands remains an 
‘open trade country’, that Europe should keep faith in ‘global trade and global 
value chains’, and that the Commission should take up initiatives that are ‘based on 
the rules of the World Trade Organization’. Similarly, Bernd Lange argues for ‘due 
diligence’ legislation and making sure that the global supply chains are ‘really fair’. 
In a resolution, also the European Parliament states to be ‘convinced that corporate 
human rights and environmental due diligence are necessary conditions in order 
to prevent and mitigate future crises and ensure sustainable value chains’. Again, 
however, this is in line with previous demands and the free trade and growth model 
is not questioned. 
 
In sum, what we have seen and heard on EU policy measures so far suggests 
continuity, with some first-order change. Interventions have been relatively limited 
and embedded within a free trade discourse. It should also be noted that even the 
neoliberal night-watchman state would not exclude firm government intervention 
during times of emergency. Proponents of this vision have recognized that in the 
very acute phase of the crisis, ‘we are all Keynesians’, but are already calling for a 
return to ‘normal’ as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, there have been initiatives for 
further liberalization and strengthening of the WTO. Ongoing negotiations of free 
trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand – which arguably do not 
contribute to shorter supply-chains or reshoring ambitions – have not been 
questioned by the main trade policy-makers in the Commission, Council and 
Parliament.  
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Table 1: What’s the problem? Causes, solutions, and EU trade policy 
 Main 
goal 
Democracy Problem  
 
Solution 
Neoliberalism Growth  Liberal 
democracy  
(elitist) 
- Virus / health 
- Production 
capacity 
- Export 
restrictions  
- Economic 
impact of 
lockdown 
- Temporal restrictions on 
specific products  little less 
trade 
- Produce more  more 
trade 
- Lower tariffs  more trade 
- Economic growth  more 
trade 
- e-commerce agreement 
and stronger WTO  more 
trade 
Securitization Security Illiberal / 
authoritarian  
(right-
populist) 
- Foreigners 
- Liberalism 
- National protectionism  
less trade 
- security / geopolitics 
 less trade 
Deglobalization  Human 
thriving 
/ Eco-
balance 
Radical  
(left-
populist) 
- Relation to 
ecosystem  
- Neoliberal 
globalization 
De/postgrowth, post-
development, doughnut 
 (much) less trade 
 
In order to understand this status quo, we refer to the three conditions above. The 
perception of the crisis seems particularly important. In the ongoing discursive 
struggle on the nature of the crisis – the causes and solutions – those advocating the 
status quo point at three causes. First, the crisis as a quirk of nature (indeed, a 
virus). It is an externality that requires technical solutions and emergency 
measures. There is hence no need for structural changes. Second, there is a 
problem of insufficient capacity to produce equipment to fight covid-19 and 
insufficient strategic reserves of such products. The best ‘guarantee’ to solve this is 
through ‘the global integration of supply chains’. Hence the problem lies with the 
supply side, which should be adjusted; and the maximum that governments can do 
is ‘encourage all manufacturers’ to increase capacity, not by investing in these 
industries but by ‘making standards for medical supplies freely available to any 
interested company’. As said above, another response has been to abolish tariffs 
for imports of medical equipment, which will, according to EU Commissioner for 
Economy Paolo Gentiloni ‘help (European health workers) to receive the 
equipment they need to protect themselves and continue saving lives.’ Reshoring 
should be limited to a specific number of products. In this regard Bernd Lange 
refers not only to the fact that the price of products might increase as a consequence 
of reshoring, but also to the harmful impact of reshoring production on developing 
countries that rely on exports of textile and other products to Europe. Third, the 
export restrictions that some EU member states and other countries have imposed 
on critical equipment are framed as the problem – not the solution. They are framed 
as instances of ‘coronationalism’ that endanger the European project. Thus again, 
the solution is more free trade. As argued by the Simon Evenett, director of Global 
Trade Alert and influential free trade advocate: trade barriers put ‘countless lives 
at risk’ whereas open trade can help in ‘fighting the pandemic’ as well as the ‘future 
economic fallout’. 
 
 - 11 - 
Whether this narrative would be successful, depends also on whether alternative 
paradigms are available and accepted by those who occupy power positions. 
Although the neoliberal paradigm may once more lose some of its feathers, and EU 
policy-makers may be less convinced this time, compared to the time of the euro 
crisis, that free trade is the solution to the crisis, it remains hard to find challenging 
paradigms that are comprehensive and that receive wide support. Indeed, it seems 
that ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA). The myth that we all have benefited from free 
trade (‘win-win’) after the second world war, which was caused by protectionism 
in the 1930s, remains intuitively appealing. Against this background, numerous 
observers have warned against ‘coronationalism’ related to protective trade 
measures.  
 
It is also a powerful narrative. Not only export competitive businesses in the ‘North’ 
benefit from free trade but also ‘emerging’ (or emerged) economies such as China 
have a strong interest in pursuing free trade. Despite second-order variations, also 
states such as China, Brazil, India and South Africa have embraced the growth-
based paradigm. Within the EU, Business Europe, the biggest EU lobby group of 
corporations, and the pharmaceutical industry associations have explicitly 
demanded to ‘to maintain open trade and efficient supply chains, both within the 
EU and with the EU’s trading partners’ and to ‘manifest the EU’s leadership role in 
defending an open and rules-based global trading system’. Influential think tanks 
also highlight the need to avoid trade restrictions  and promote liberalization to 
address this crisis. This is a message that very much resonates with the European 
Commission’s response as stipulated above. 
 
Nevertheless, there are alternative views in the making and the current crisis might 
strengthen them. We have shown above that the EU is stretching the neoliberal 
paradigm rather than replacing it with something else. However, if stretched too 
far its legitimacy may be undermined. The next section warns that in addition to 
deglobalization, also securitization might be a candidate for paradigm change.  
 
 
Cent 4: The alternative may not be romantic 
 
Progressive thinkers and activists arguing for deglobalisation surely have a point 
that There Are Many Alternatives Ready and Available (TAMARA) that have been 
developed before the outbreak of the corona crisis. There have been plenty of calls 
for degrowth, postgrowth, postdevelopment, foundational economy, economy of 
the common good, circular and other doughnut economies. Thought exercises on 
progressive, emancipatory and transformative alternatives have received a 
growing popularity – and for good reasons. Experiments with more sustainable 
food chains, alternative energy arrangements and banking systems have been 
mushrooming, especially at the local level. Such initiatives may be less prominent 
in news reporting on the crisis, but they are happening on the growth. The 
deglobalization scenario involves the disintegration of global value chains. It aims 
for more local and sustainable trade flows, and hence also less trade overall. 
However, that does not exclude solidarity at the international level. Radical reforms 
of the world economy should address social and ecological injustices, for instance 
by reforming international institutions such as the WTO and the World Bank, 
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guaranteeing fair taxation of multinational companies, providing debt relief for 
highly indebted countries, reestablishing capital controls against speculative 
capital, and indeed legitimate brakes on global trade.  
 
The problem may not be the substance of the proposed alternatives, but rather the 
lack of a clear and single model (condition 2) that receives wide acceptance with 
those in power (condition 3). When the world shifted to Keynesianism in the late 
1940s, this not only followed the disaster of a second world war but also the general 
acceptance of the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, which had been elaborated and 
even partly applied in the 1930s. The turn to neoliberalism in the late 1970s and 
1980s followed not only a decade of stagflation but also 30 years of advocacy of 
alternative economic ideas by Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek and their 
followers. Unfortunately, advocates of deglobalisation have not yet reached such a 
prominent status, and certainly not with those in power. There are meaningful 
changes following the ‘coronashock’, such as the city of Amsterdam embracing 
Kate Raworth’s doughnut model at city level, and a recent Financial Times (the 
newspaper of the global financial elite) editorial arguing that formerly utopian 
ideas such as a ‘wealth taxes’ should now be taken seriously. French President 
Emanuel Macron pleaded for a ‘massive debt cancellation for African countries’. 
Let’s see if such initiatives are the harbinger of paradigm change or rather another 
cooptation strategy whereby (formerly) radical concepts are hollowed out. The 
proof of the doughnut is in the eating. 
 
On a structural level, the failure of the ‘west’ to address the current crisis may 
catalyze the ‘dewesternization’ and even the ‘decolonization’ of the world. This 
involves a material shift in power, for instance through the renegotiation of EU trade 
agreements with African countries and the strengthening of the African Free Trade 
Agreement, as argued by David Mwambari. At the same time, as noted by Olivia 
Rutazibwa, it involves an epistemic shift of the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ whereby 
‘western superiority’ receives a blow and ‘alternative (anti-colonial) solidarities’ 
emerge. In terms of alternatives to neoliberal globalization, it will be important to 
follow-up on whether the corona crisis effectively shakes up global power 
structures and how exactly new powers stand towards the free trade dogma. 
 
It is also unclear how successful deglobalisation advocates will be in interpreting 
the current crisis for their agenda (condition 1; see Table 1). When it comes to the 
cause of the epidemic, two issues have been stressed. First, the growing number 
of zoonotic diseases (such as Ebola, swine flu, and covid-19) stems from the 
increased expansion of humans in previously undistorted ecosystems. Equally, 
critics have pointed to links between zoonotic epidemics and the growth of 
industrial farming. The consequence of this analysis is that humans should find a 
new balance with ecosystems, as environmentalists have been arguing for 
decades. Or concretely, that people should shift to plant-based eating. Specifically 
relating to EU trade policy, there have already been calls from some members of 
the European Parliament and environmental groups to ban wildlife trade. Given the 
amount of legal and illegal trade of exotic animals in the EU, a new zoonotic disease 
could as well have emerged in Europe instead of China, they argue. Second, 
globalization has made it easier for viruses to quickly spread all over the world. 
The current crisis exposes the vulnerability of world-wide transaction flows. 
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Worldwide trade and mobility have made our societies extremely vulnerable for 
the spread of diseases, while global value chains have exposed our dependency 
on key equipment such as masks or ventilators and have made us generally 
vulnerable for distortions that may occur unexpectedly in the ‘just-in-time’ delivery 
model that characterize these value chains. As with the climate crisis, the covid-19 
episode once again illustrates that our obsession with economic growth leads to 
unsustainable outcomes. It also reinforces inequalities within and between 
societies. Interestingly, not only the ascribed causes of the crisis but also the current 
response is being interpreted as something that can favour this agenda. By putting 
a break on globalization, we are now forced to cope with degrowth, to reconsider 
local production, to break global value chains, and to strengthen solidarity 
between people. As the fairtrade movement puts it, the crisis provides an 
‘opportunity to radically rethink the unsustainable and unequal global growth 
model and replace it with an emphasis on well-being, sustainability and equity’. 
Strengthened by evidence that the lockdown societies have shown exceptional 
solidarity between people and changed our views on work-life balance and the 
need of a healthy life, this scenario would advocate a radical restructuring of the 
global economy towards more local and sustainable units. In this scenario, 
degrowth is likely while social and ecological concerns drive trade (and other) 
policies. Inevitably, this involves the marginalization of trade policy in the armory 
of the EU and/or the renegotiation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements 
into arrangements that foster sustainable trade.  
 
It is too early to assess how convincing this problem definition would be, and as 
argued above whether it will manage to present a clear alternative and powerful 
paradigm. It is more likely to become successful if the corona crisis turns into a 
crisis of food security and also damages the EU system of food supply. European 
civil society organizations claim that the current crisis shows the need for an 
ambitious ‘Farm to Fork’ EU food strategy; although a food crisis could be 
interpreted as evidence for the need of even more free trade. So far, open trade 
has been the dominant EU discourse in reaction to the crisis, as explained above. 
European trade policy-makers have not fundamentally questioned global value 
chains – except that for specific products reshoring back to Europe has been 
advanced and it has been argued that global value chains need to become 
‘resilient’, ‘sustainable’ and ‘inclusive’.  
 
Instead, there are indications of the trade measures that might herald another 
paradigm, namely securitization. There are indeed also not attractive alternatives 
(TAANAA). Under the more dangerous ‘securitization’ paradigm, nation-states (or 
perhaps the EU as a whole) pursue first and foremost their security and sovereignty 
in what they consider a Hobbesian world where people and countries are in a 
continuous struggle for survival. This basically corresponds with what International 
Relations scholars, cynically, call the ‘realist’ school. Liberal values such as 
freedom of speech and international interdependence become subordinated to the 
overriding goal of security. The securitization paradigm involves a high suspicion 
towards anything ‘foreign’ and ever-changing coalitions of allies and enemies at 
the international level.  
 
 - 14 - 
How would these movements then interpret the corona crisis for their own benefit? 
Two points can be suggested (see Table 1). First, ‘foreigners’ would be blamed for 
the virus. There is anecdotal evidence of rising hostility against Chinese nationals 
in the beginning of the corona crisis, and Asian hostility against Europeans in the 
subsequent phase. In public debates, the fact that the virus (‘again’) came from 
China has confirmed latent racist stereotypes about the habits of Chinese people 
(‘eating wild animals’) or even confirming conspiracy theories (‘it was a biological 
weapon produced in a Chinese lab’). US President Donald Trump’s framing in 
terms of the ‘China virus’ or ‘Wuhan virus’ fits in this context. Second, liberal values 
may be framed as obstacles against the security of the state and its people. In this 
regard, authoritarian states such as China or Vietnam could serve as an example of 
how a health crisis should be addressed. Those countries that take most pride in 
their liberal superiority and initially assumed that the corona crisis could be 
averted without strong government intervention – the United States and the United 
Kingdom – have proven to be hopelessly naïve. The corona crisis is then above all 
a security threat, even a state of war, that needs to be combatted with all available 
forces.  
 
In this scenario, trade policy loses its relatively autonomous position in the EU’s 
institutions. Trade instruments become geostrategic tools of the EU’s foreign and 
security policy. Although economic growth continues to be important, it is no 
longer a panacea. Instead of pursuing free trade under the assumption that – 
eventually – everyone will benefit, trade policy henceforth discriminates specific 
countries depending on whether they are allies or enemies. Institutionally, trade 
policy would be transferred from the European Commission to the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) or even back to the member states.  
 
This scenario may (hopefully) seem unlikely. However, it resonates with anti-
liberal, radical right-wing forces that have been emerging in Europe (and 
elsewhere) over the past decades. In other words, the securitization scenario is 
already being written as an alternative paradigm against the ‘liberal’ and 
‘cosmopolitan’ elites. Moreover, authoritarian regimes are already effectively 
using the crisis for their own agenda, as we have seen in Hungary. Also mainstream 
politicians in Europe – for instance, French President Emmanuel Macron – have 
frequently used war-related terminologies to justify the fight against corona. 
Interestingly, the perceived danger of strategic companies losing control to China 
was not only discussed around the (virtual) meeting tables of Trade Ministers: also 
the NATO Defence Ministers discussed the issue on 15 April 2020. In other words, 
the three conditions for paradigm change in this direction are partly fulfilled. 
 
When it comes to EU trade policy and external relations in general, securitization 
tendencies have already been noticed in recent years. Scholars have pointed out 
that the EU’s neoliberal agenda also tends to shift towards securitization). Some 
have coined the new trend of geopoliticization of EU trade policy. It may also fit 
within the ambition of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to become a 
‘geopolitical Commission’. The ‘hardening’ of the EU’s commercial policy can be 
seen most notably towards China, which was recently labelled an ‘systemic rival’ 
by the European Commission. In the context of the corona crisis, the Commission 
decided to publish guidelines on screening of incoming investments, which might 
 - 15 - 
entail a stronger approach than what was agreed in 2019. While the Commission 
continues to argue in favour of ‘open trade’ and ‘open investment’, some member 
states are clearly keener on protecting national and/or European markets.  
 
To be sure, we are far from a full-fledged securitization and any indications should 
be interpreted cautiously. Our main point is that if a true paradigm shift would 
happen, the progressive deglobalization scenario is not the only candidate, and we 
should keep an eye on the alternative of securitization. Pursuing the end of 
neoliberalism carries the danger to throw the baby out with the bathwater – or the 
liberal values of western democracies with the ‘new’ radical agenda of the 1980s to 
deregulate, privatize and liberalize at the expense of collective interests. In 
addition to watching closely how things evolve, concrete actions of individuals and 
groups also matter as highlighted below. 
 
 
Cent 5: Agency matters 
 
People make a difference. None of the changes or continuities are fully determined 
by some logic that is outside human behaviour. All three conditions for change - 
the perception and interpretation of the crisis, the construction of alternative 
paradigms, and shifting power relations – implies a struggle between people. On 
EU trade policy, we have seen that the scope of conflict has radically enlarged since 
the ‘battle of Seattle’ in 1999, the campaign against the Economic Partnership 
Agreements in 2007-2008 and most famously the protests against the free trade 
agreements with the US and Canada. The genie is out of the bottle and trade policy 
will be at the center of any debate on the future of the EU.  
 
That said, structures are adaptable and resilient. Just like it took Friedman, Hayek 
and other members of the Mont Pelerin Society several decades to create, defend 
and disseminate their ideas before they became dominant in the 1980s, so can we 
see that today people from diverse corners are bricolageing alternative ideas 
against neoliberalism. The anti-TTIP campaigns have been relatively successful 
because they draw on networks and expertise that activists and researchers had 
started to build in the end 1990s during the protests against the WTO. While a crisis 
can hit hard and fast, paradigm change is likely to be a matter of generations. How 
this evolves depends on how millions of individuals and groups challenge existing 
ideas and structures. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The EU’s trade policy response to the corona crisis has so far been in line with the 
reaction to the euro crisis: export restrictions should be limited and temporary, 
open trade is essential for guaranteeing medical equipment, more liberalization 
will be part of the solution and may eventually be necessary to recover from the 
economic fallout. While the problem is framed in terms of technicalities (health 
system functioning and productive capacity of key industries), solutions comply 
with the EU’s strong belief in the benefits of free trade and remain at first- or 
second-order levels. We have suggested that the neoliberal paradigm remains 
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powerful and displays resilience, despite the emergence of alternatives such as 
deglobalization (the progressive scenario that involves radical democracy) and 
securitization (the conservative scenario involving anti-liberalism and 
authoritarianism). 
 
There is no doubt that the neoliberal free trade paradigm will continue to be 
challenged and eventually replaced. It is however highly speculative when and 
how this will happen – and what role the covid-19 might plays in this regard. Going 
back to our initial remark: it is complicated. First, the paradigms are ideal typical 
and still sketchy. Thinking about alternative paradigms by definition involves an 
exploration of the unthinkable. We have indications of deglobalization and 
securitization, but their contours remain vague. There may also be alternatives that 
we have not considered. It would be easier to analyze whether trade policy 
initiatives taken in the current crisis make the EU slightly more protectionist or 
liberalized. While it is important to map such first- and second-order changes, it is 
equally crucial to perform some academic distancing and understand how these 
measures relate to paradigm change. This requires much more in-depth research 
that relies on different disciplines. 
 
Second, we may witness the confluence of different paradigms. Societal changes 
typically involve the implicit or explicit cooperation of strange bedfellows. Sticking 
to the trichotomy, we could identify three coalitions. First, neoliberalism and 
securitization proponents have in common that they don’t fundamentally question 
the holy grail of economic growth. Both are wary about emancipatory politics that 
aim to address social and ecological injustices. Indeed, also in the context of the 
EU, scholars have pointed to the ‘authoritarian’ nature of neoliberalism. Second, 
the securitization and deglobalization advocates obviously share an aversion to the 
current political and economic elites. Both are also open to more protectionism, 
and hence less free trade. Here too, we could find indications in arguments against 
dependency on global value chains, and in favour of reshoring and even 
nationalization of strategic industries. Third, the neoliberal and deglobalization 
scenarios share common roots in liberal philosophies. Although these play out 
differently, commonalities might become visible through shared opposition to 
authoritarian movements. Hence, the trichotomy is not a trilemma but rather a 
device to reflect on possible paradigm change, thereby transcending the oft-made 
distinction between free trade versus protectionism. Which paradigm will reign in 
the future, may well depend on how successful these alliances will be. 
 
 
